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Abstract. Recent studies suggest that the emergence of cooperative
behavior can be explained by generalized reciprocity, a behavioral mech-
anism based on the principle of “help anyone if helped by someone”. In
multi-agent systems, the cooperative dynamics is largely determined by
the network structure which dictates the interactions among neighboring
agents. These interactions often exhibit multidimensional features, either
as relationships of different types or temporal dynamics, both of which
may be modeled as a “multiplex” network. Against this background, here
we advance the research on cooperation models inspired by generalized
reciprocity by considering a multidimensional networked society. Our re-
sults reveal that a multiplex network structure may enhance the role of
generalized reciprocity in promoting cooperation, whereby some of the
network dimensions act as a latent support for the others. As a result,
generalized reciprocity forces the cooperative contributions of the indi-
vidual agents to concentrate in the dimension which is most favorable
for the existence of cooperation.
Keywords: Multi-Agent Systems · Cooperation ·Multidimensional Net-
works.
1 Introduction
Ever since the pioneering work of Axelrod [1] on the stability of direct reci-
procity (tit-for-tat strategy) in a lattice structured iterated prisoner’s dilemma,
a lot of effort has been put into discovering how different reciprocal mechanisms
for emergence of cooperation fare under various topological circumstances. In
particular, in [31,34,43] the concept of network reciprocity was examined, and
in [36] the conditions that lead to promotion of cooperation through indirect
reciprocity in complex networks were explored. Other notable studies include
the role of emotions [25,26] or punishment of defectors [2,24,37], dynamical link
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formation through indirect reciprocity [17], and even considering continuous ac-
tion profiles [40,39].
Under all these mechanisms cooperation evolves as an inherent feature of
the competitiveness between the interacting agents. Recent biological studies,
however, suggest that cooperative behavior can also emerge and be sustained if
it is based on generalized reciprocity, a rule based on the principle “help anyone if
helped by someone” [47]. In [42,7,20] it was shown that cooperation may emerge
under this mechanism as a consequence of the changes in the physiological state
of the agents caused by their positive experience from previous interactions.
The first steps towards the development of a framework to study the role of a
state-based generalized reciprocity update rule in networked societies were made
in [48]. In this work, the authors developed a simple model for pairwise inter-
actions where agents send cooperation requests to randomly chosen neighbors.
The acceptance of the requests is stochastically determined by a sole variable
called internal cooperative state which reflects the agents’ current welfare. A dis-
tinctive characteristic of the model is that, in steady state, the simple decision
rule promotes cooperation while, at the same time, prevents the agents being
exploited by their respective network environment.
While this and similar models shed valuable insights on the role that network
topology plays in promoting cooperation, most of them have so far addressed
only interactions on networks that are of one “dimension”, ignoring possible mul-
tidimensional phenomena, i.e. multiplex network structures. This is an obvious
drawback since real-life networks often exhibit heterogeneous properties within
the edge structure that are of fundamental value to the phenomena present in
the system [22]. For instance, in social network analyses the patterning and
interweaving of different types of relationships are needed to describe and char-
acterize social structures [10,50]. In telecommunication networks, the physical
edges are often “sliced” into multiple parts in order to support the requirement
of different devices [44,29]. Even genetic and protein relations between organ-
isms constructed in multiple ways are crucial for the analysis of their global
interaction properties [45,14].
To this end, here we extend the model introduced in [48] to account for a
multiplex network structure, with the aim to characterize the network cooper-
ation dynamics under the assumption of a state-based behavioral mechanism
rooted in generalized reciprocity5. In our model the dimensions act as plat-
forms which facilitate transactions between active members. The activity of the
agents is modeled by constraining their presence to one dimension per round,
and by making them able to answer only to requests from that same dimension.
This assumption is consistent with the random walk models on multiplex net-
works [15], and is justified in systems where the round duration is very short
and/or when agents have limited interaction capacities. The resulting mecha-
5 In this sense, we do not account for “competition” between strategies [3], nor as-
sume evolutionary updates or imitation [35]. Instead, we suppose that a form of a
generalized reciprocity mechanism has evolved in the consciousness of the agents,
whose further dynamics is solely determined by the multiplex network structure.
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nism, while preventing exploitation of the individual agents, exhibits additional
features that act as promoters of cooperation in a multiplex network structure.
Specifically, by allowing for heterogeneous benefits and costs (i.e. different pa-
rameter values across different dimensions), we show that cooperation can sur-
vive in the observed dimension even if the cost exceeds the benefit, as long as
there is another dimension which acts as a support (having benefit-to-cost ratio
larger than one). This essential characteristic of the new model comes in contrast
to one-dimensional networks where the benefit being larger than the cost is a
prerequisite for cooperation. Moreover, by introducing simple dynamics for the
probability that an agent is present in a certain dimension, we show that, under
a behavioral model based on generalized reciprocity, the individual cooperative
contributions effectively concentrate to the dimension where most of their co-
operative neighbors are also present. Based on these observations, we discuss
connections to reinforcement learning, in particular to the model of Roth and
Erev [41] and extensions therein [12].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we revisit the
concept of generalized reciprocity and discuss the specifics of our state-based
behavioral model. In Section 3 we introduce the stochastic network interaction
model, together with its deterministic counterpart. We also introduce more de-
tails about the state-based behavioral update. The exposition in Section 4 (Re-
sults) is organized in 3 subsections. In Section 4.1 we derive the conditions for
the emergence and stability of cooperation with homogeneous parameters across
the multiplex network dimensions. In Section 4.2 we continue by relaxing this
assumption and numerically examine the model properties with heterogeneous,
i.e. nonidentical parameters across the network dimensions. This is done under
the assumption of a random, but predetermined selection of the interaction di-
mension (i.e. fixed, predetermined probability of presence in a certain network
dimension). In Section 4.3 we analyse the cooperation dynamics under a mod-
ified rule for the dimension presence, according to which the agents are free to
adapt the probability of presence in each of the network dimensions as a func-
tion of their payoff (state-dependent probability of presence). The analysis is
performed across different types of random multiplex networks, with the aim to
investigate the role of the network topology. In Section 4.4 we test the model on
an empirical dataset that describes the relationships between households of 75
Indian Villages (multidimensional networks) [5]. The numerical simulations on
this real-life example support the general conclusion that the multiplex network
structure, combined with an adaptive dimension update rule, enhances network
cooperation in the multi-agent scenario with behavioral update based on gener-
alized reciprocity. Section 5 (Conclusions) summarizes our findings and discusses
possible directions for future work.
2 Background
Generalized reciprocity’s roots lie within the concept of indirect reciprocity, a
rule described as “help someone who is helpful” [11,33,47]. In the literature
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it can also be found under the terms of “upstream indirect reciprocity” [11]
and “upstream tit-for-tat” [32]. In biological systems indirect and generalized
reciprocity are essentially two different ideas since the former requires advanced
cognitive capabilities of the involved entities. In particular, with anonymous
interactions, applying indirect reciprocity requires that each agent keeps tracks
of the reputation of all potential co-interacting partners, whereas generalized
reciprocity requires each agent to know only his own recent history. Due to the
complexity, indirect reciprocity has only been documented in humans [49]. On
the other hand, real-life behavior based on generalized reciprocity has not only
been found to be present in humans [7,4], but has also been observed in many
other organisms, including rats [42], monkeys [23] and dogs [18].
The theoretical models that have been developed for the purpose of explain-
ing the innate mechanism behind generalized reciprocity may roughly be di-
vided into three main groups, though with possible overlaps. The first group
encompasses deterministic behavioral update rules where the agents base their
decisions of whether to cooperate or not solely on the outcome of their last
interaction [38,16]. The models within the second group address the scenario
where generalized reciprocity emerges as a result of a random walk in which
the altruistic act of one agent initiates a chain (sequence) of similar acts across
the network. Nevertheless, as stated in [32,13], this mechanism by itself is not
sufficient for the promotion of cooperation unless other mechanisms such as di-
rect or network reciprocity are already in place. The models within the third
group address a behavioral update rule according to which the individual levels
of cooperation are adjusted on the basis of an internal state reflecting the agents’
general well-being (i.e. fitness). This adjustment takes place over time as a result
of interactions with other agents [6,48].
The specifics of our model are such that it may be categorized as being in
the intersection between the first and the third group. In particular, it shares
the state-based behavioral update with the models from the third group. On
the other hand, by approximating the stochastic interactions by a deterministic
model, as done in [38], our model is related with the models in the first group.
Nevertheless, differently from the other deterministic approaches where the strat-
egy choice was assumed to be binary (either fully cooperate or defect), our model
can be placed in a continuous iterated Prisoner dilemma framework [40,39], with
the note that the choice of the particular strategy (from the continuous set of
possible strategies) in each round is determined by the agent’s state (reflecting
its accumulated payoff, i.e. well-being).
Compared to the classical (i.e. one-dimensional) random graph model, the
multiplex network structure offers additional degrees of freedom which render
the extension of the one-dimensional models nontrivial. While the evolution of
cooperation in multiplex networks has been addressed in the context of other
types of reciprocity [19,8], our interaction model and the state-based behavioral
update yield interesting implications on the cooperative behavior in these net-
works. Similar to [48], the accent here is on the role of the network structure and
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the thereby related neighborhood importance index, here generalized to account
for the different temporal interaction model due to the multiplex structure.
3 Model Description
3.1 Network interaction model
We consider a population ofN agents whose relations are modeled as a connected
multiplex network, defined as the triplet G (N , E ,L), where N (the set of nodes)
corresponds to the set of agents, E ⊆ N ×N is the set of edges that describes
the relationships between pairs of agents, and L is the set of L properties that
can be attributed to the edges and which define the dimensions of the network.
Formally, a dimension can be defined as the graph G[l]
(
N , E [l]
)
in which E [l] is
the subset of E having the property l ∈ L. Each dimension is given via an N×N
adjacency matrixA[l], where the ij-th entry A
[l]
ij ∈ {0, 1} between pairs of agents
i, j ∈ N (A
[l]
ij = 1 indicating neighborhood relation, i.e. (i, j) ∈ E
[l]).
The interactions between the agents are modeled as follows: in each round t,
each agent i:
1. randomly chooses a dimension l where it will be present in that round;
2. sends a cooperation request to a randomly (on uniform) chosen agent j from
its neighborhood in the l-th dimension, j ∈ N
[l]
i ;
3. upon selection, if agent j is present in the the l-th dimension in round t,
it receives the request and cooperates with probability pj(t) representing
the agent’s internal cooperative state at round t; When cooperating, agent
j pays a cost c[l] > 0 for agent i to receive a benefit b[l] > 0.
Given this interaction model, the random payoff of agent i at round t may be
characterized as
yi(t) =
∑
l
v
[l]
i (t)

b[l]v[l]j (t)xj(t)− c[l]xi(t)
∑
k∈N
[l]
i
ρ
[l]
k (t)v
[l]
k (t)

 . (1)
In (1), v
[l]
i (t) is the i-th outcome of an L dimensional categorical variable parametrized
by B
[l]
i (t), which itself is a random variable describing the probability that i is
present in layer l in round t. The selected index from the neighborhood of i
is a random variable uniformly distributed on the set N
[l]
i , j ∼ U(N
[l]
i ); xj(t),
j = 1, . . . , N , are Bernoulli random variables, each with parameter pj(t); ρ
[l]
k is a
Bernoulli random variable with parameter 1/d
[l]
k , where d
[l]
k is the degree of agent
k in dimension l, d
[l]
k =
∑
hA
[l]
kh; the term
∑
k∈N
[l]
i
ρ
[l]
k (t) captures the random
number of agents (neighbors of i in l) which send a cooperative request to i in
dimension l during round t.
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3.2 Deterministic approximation
We approximate the stochastic model (1) by a deterministic model in which the
random variables are substituted with their respective expectations
yi(t) =
∑
l
B
[l]
i (t)

b[l]∑
j
A
[l]
ij
d
[l]
i
B
[l]
j (t)pj(t)− c
[l]z
[l]
i (t)pi(t)

 . (2)
The term z
[l]
i (t) in (2) is defined as
z
[l]
i (t) =
∑
j
A
[l]
ji
d
[l]
j
B
[l]
j (t), (3)
is the temporal extension of the neighborhood importance index discussed in [48],
in dimension l. This quantity acts as a local centrality measure of an agent,
with agent i being more “important” in the addressed dimension if it has many
neighbors which are at the same time also present in that dimension, and the
neighbors themselves have few neighbors. In our model of interactions, this agent
would be called upon rather frequently in the studied dimension.
The motivation to use the deterministic model (2) is that it captures the
long-term behavior of the stochastic model, i.e. provides reliable approximation
of its steady state behavior. Numerical simulations of the stochastic model in the
long run suggest that the stochastic variables can indeed be approximated by
their respective expectations, without affecting the long-term network behavior,
thus justifying the approximation. In Fig. 1 we display an example for the deter-
ministic interactions between two agents that are placed on a two-dimensional
network.
We also define the aggregate time-dependent neighborhood importance index
Zi(t) of agent i as
Zi(t) =
∑
lB
[l]
i (t)z
[l]
i (t)∑
lB
[l]
i (t)
∑
j
A
[l]
ij
d
[l]
i
B
[l]
j (t)
. (4)
As we will see in more detail in Section 4 (Results), the probability distribution
of the quantity Z(t) across the agents crucially determines the global cooper-
ative behavior in the network. This quantity, which is a form of aggregated
centrality measure in the multiplex network setting, critically reflects the role
of the network topology on the cooperation dynamics in our interaction model.
We elaborate on this in more detail in Section 4 where we address multiplex
networks generated from Erdos-Renyi (ER) and Barabasi-Albert (BA) random
graph models, as well as a real-world example of a social network describing
relationships between households in Indian villages [5].
With the above, we write (2) in a more compact (vector) form as
y(t) = Θ(t) · p(t),
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Fig. 1: An example for the deterministic interactions on a two dimensional net-
work between two agents i and j (colored in dark blue). For illustrative purposes
we exclude the round notation. Filled colored edges indicate neighborhood rela-
tion in the corresponding dimension, whereas dashed lines are links to the same
agent in the other dimension.
where Θii(t) = −
∑
l c
[l]B
[l]
i (t)z
[l]
i (t), and Θij(t) =
∑[l]
b[l]B
[l]
i (t)
A
[l]
ij
d
[l]
i
B
[l]
j (t), for
i 6= j.
3.3 Behavioral update rule
We study a synchronous update rule, based on the accumulated payoff of the
agent i by round t, Yi(t) = Yi(t−1)+yi(t), with Yi(0) being the initial condition
and yi(0) = 0. The cooperative state of i at round t+ 1 is defined as
pi(t+ 1) = f [Yi(t)] , (5)
where we assume that the function f : R→ [0, 1] is increasing. A plausible choice
which reflects real-world behavior is the logistic function
f(ω) =
[
1 + e−k(ω−ω0)
]−1
,
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where the parameters k and ω0 define the steepness and the midpoint of the
function.
4 Results
4.1 Analytical properties of the model
Here we characterize the main properties of the model in steady state. Hereby,
we distinguish between two types of results: 1) results with homogeneous param-
eters, defined as identical benefit and costs across network dimensions, b[l] = b
and c[l] = c for all l ∈ L; and 2) results with heterogeneous parameters, i.e. the
more general case when we allow for different values for the benefits and costs
across network dimensions. We remark that the proofs for the properties follow
directly from applying the framework presented in references [46,48], neverthe-
less for concreteness in the exposition we present them.
The following property holds in general.
1. Robustness to exploitation. In steady state, the agents may be at-
tributed to two disjoint sets, W = {w ∈ N : y∗w = 0} and S = {s ∈ N : y
∗
s > 0},
based on the steady state payoff y∗i . The agents in S, which we refer to as “strong
agents”, are characterized by p∗i = 1, while the agents in W , called “weak” may
take both values p∗i = 1 and p
∗
i < 1, depending on the network parameters.
Hence, there are two sets of relations that have to be satisfied
0 =
∑
l
B
[l]∗
i

b[l]∑
j
A
[l]
ij
d
[l]
i
B[l] ∗j p
∗
j − clz
[l]∗
i p
∗
i

 , i ∈ W
y∗i =
∑
l
B
[l]∗
i

b[l]∗∑
j
A
[l]
ij
d
[l]
i
B
[l]∗
j p
∗
j − c
[l]z
[l]∗
i p
∗
i

 , i ∈ S. (6)
Note that the setsW ,S, the steady state values p∗i , i ∈ W and B
[l]∗
j , i ∈ N , l ∈ L
and the constants y∗i , i ∈ S are unknown.
Proof: The update rule (5) yields the following set of iterative equations for
i = 1, . . . , N
pi(t+ 1) = f (Yi(t− 1) +Θi(t) · p(t)) ,
where Θi(t) is the i−th row of Θ(t). In equilibrium it has to be fulfilled
p∗i = f
(
f−1 (p∗i ) +Θ
∗
ip
∗
)
,
for i = 1, . . . , N . By applying the inverse map we get
f−1 (p∗i ) = f
−1 (p∗i ) +Θ
∗
ip
∗. (7)
The above requires y∗i
.
= Θ∗ip
∗ = 0 which further implies p∗i = 0, unless either
p∗i = 1 (i.e. Y
∗
i = f
−1 (p∗i ) =∞), or p
∗
i = 0 (i.e.Y
∗
i = −∞).
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It is easy to verify that if there exists i such that p∗i = 0, then the same is
true for all i ∈ N . Indeed, when p∗i = 0, then from (2) and since
∑
lB
[l]∗
i = 1, it
must hold that either: 1) y∗i > 0, or: 2) p
∗
j = 0 for all j in the neighborhood of
i, j ∈
⋃
l∈LN
[l]
i . The condition 1 implies p
∗
i = 1, which is a contradiction. The
condition 2 yields p∗i = 0 for all i ∈ N by repeating the same argument to the
nodes in the neighborhood of i, until all agents are reached. We note that this
case is also covered by the requirement Θ∗ip
∗ = 0, with the solution p∗ = 0.
Hence, an equilibrium fulfills p∗ ∈ 0 ∪ (0 1]N and is thereby characterized by
non-negative steady state payoffs y∗i ≥ 0. 
The following properties hold only for a multiplex network with homogeneous
parameters. We relax this assumption in the numerical analysis performed in the
following sections.
2. Existence of cooperation. A necessary condition for existence of coop-
erators (agents with p∗i > 0) is b/c ≥ 1.
Proof: Note that the total network payoff can be written as
∑
i
y∗i =
∑
l
(
b[l] − c[l]
)∑
i
B
[l]∗
i z
[l]∗
i p
∗
i . (8)
It is easy to show that, b/c < 1 implies p∗i = 0 for all i ∈ N . Indeed, if there
exists i such that p∗i > 0, then the total steady state network payoff is strictly
negative, implying that there is some i for which y∗i < 0 (contradiction). Hence,
the necessity of b/c ≥ 1 for existence of cooperation. 
3. Promotion of cooperation.When b/c > 1, we observe the steady state
probabilities are strictly greater than 0, p∗i > 0 for all i ∈ N .
Proof: By contradiction. If there exists i such that p∗i = 0 then, as already
discussed, it must hold that p∗i = 0, for all i ∈ N . This, however, would yield a
total network payoff
∑
i y
∗
i = 0, which contradicts (8). 
4. Sufficient condition for existence of strong agents. When b/c > 1,
there is always at least one strong agent in the network.
Proof: This follows from the observation that when b/c > 1 the right-hand-
side of (8) is strictly greater than zero, which implies that there is at least one
i for which y∗i > 0 and p
∗
i = 1. 
5. Necessary condition for the existence of strong agents. A necessary
condition for existence of strong agents, (agents with p∗i = 1), is Z
∗
i ≤ b/c.
Proof: The proof follows directly by substituting p∗i = 1 and the fact that
b[l]
∑
j
A
[l]
ij
d
[l]
i
B
[l]∗
j ≥ b
[l]
∑
j
A
[l]
ij
d
[l]
i
B
[l]∗
j p
∗
j . 
6. Full network cooperation. The condition b/c ≥ Z∗max, where Z
∗
max is
the largest neighborhood importance index in the graph, Z∗max = maxi Z
∗
i , is
both necessary and sufficient for all agents to be strong.
Proof: We note that the proof that p∗i = 1, ∀i ∈ N , implies b/c ≥ Z
∗
max,
follows directly from property 3. To prove the converse, we use contradiction.
We first define pmin = inf p
∗
i , i ∈ N , and set b/c to be greater than one (since
b/c > 1 is prerequisite for cooperative behavior). Now, let us assume that the
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converse is not true, that is b/c ≥ Z∗i for all i, and there exists some i such that
p∗i < 1. Under this assumption, for all i ∈ W we would have:
y∗i = b
∑
l
B
[l]∗
i
∑
j
A
[l]
ij
d
[l]
i
B
[l]∗
j p
∗
j − c
∑
l
B
[l]∗
i z
[l]∗
i p
∗
i
≥ b
∑
l
B
[l]∗
i
∑
j
A
[l]
ij
d
[l]
i
B
[l]∗
j p
∗
j − c
b
c
∑
l
B
[l]∗
i
∑
j
A
[l]
ij
d
[l]
i
B
[l]∗
j p
∗
i .
Since, if p∗i < 1, y
∗
i = 0, this implies
p∗i ≥
∑
lB
[l]∗
i
∑
j
A
[l]
ij
d
[l]
i
B
[l]∗
j p
∗
j
∑
lB
[l]∗
i
∑
j
A
[l]
ij
d
[l]
i
B
[l]∗
j
≥ pmin. (9)
For all i satisfying b/c > Z∗i , (9) holds with strict inequality, whereas those i
′
for which b/c = Z∗i′ must satisfy p
∗
i′ = pmin. This, however, can hold if and only
if the agents corresponding to these indices are only linked to each other in each
dimension and have the same degree in them, i.e. form a connected component.
In that case Z∗max = 1 = b/c which contradicts the assumption b/c > 1. Hence,
the converse must also be true, which concludes the proof. 
4.2 The role of heterogeneous parameters
We continue the analysis by relaxing the assumption of homogeneous parameters,
and consider the situation where each dimension l has its own benefit b[l] and
cost c[l]. Since our goal is to examine the effect of heterogeneous parameters, we
develop a null model in which the probability for dimension presence is uniform
in every round.
For this case, we compare two different multiplex networks each composed
of two dimensions (the results can be easily generalized to networks with more
dimensions). In particular, the first multiplex network type represents a natural
generalization of the Erdos-Renyi (ER) random graph, while the second is a
multiplex version of the Barabasi-Albert (BA) preferential attachment graph.
In an ER random graph an edge between two agents has a fixed probability of
being present, independently of the other edges. As a consequence the degree
follows a Poisson distribution. On the other hand, a BA graph is constructed
by a dynamical process in which in each step a new agent is introduced, and
this agent makes connections to other agents that are already in the graph
with probability proportional to their degree, thus ending up with a power law
degree distribution. More details about the algorithms used for generating these
multiplex networks can be read in references [9,27,28].
In what follows, we will consider networks which consist of 100 agents, and
where the average degree in each dimension is 8. Since the correlations between
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the edges in different dimensions should play a prominent role in determining the
steady state level of cooperation we are going to study three different scenarios.
In the ER graph, we will examine the possibility of overlapping edges, i.e. situ-
ations i) when there is no edge overlap in different dimensions, ii) when half of
the edges overlap, and iii) when all edges overlap. In the BA graph we study the
cases where the degree correlation ρ generated through preferential attachment
is i) negatively correlated, ii) there is no correlation, and iii) is positively corre-
lated between the dimensions. Formally we measure the correlation between the
degrees in separate dimensions through the Pearson correlation coefficient, i.e
ρ12 =
∑
i
(
d
[1]
i − 〈d
[1]〉
)(
d
[2]
i − 〈d
[2]〉
)
√∑
i
(
d
[1]
i − 〈d
[1]〉
)2√∑
i
(
d
[2]
i − 〈d
[2]〉
)2 . (10)
In equation (10) 〈d[l]〉 denotes the average degree in dimension l.
The results are depicted in Fig. 2. Panels (a)-(b) respectively show the evolu-
tion of the fraction of strong agents for the multiplex network generated by the
ER and BA multiplex networks while the benefit to cost ratio in the second di-
mension, b[2]/c[2] is varied, whereas the benefit to cost ratio in the first dimension
is kept constant (b[1]/c[1] = 1.08). In general, we observe that the ER networks
require much lower benefit to cost b[2]/c[2] ratios for displaying full cooperation
than the BA networks. In addition, in the case of ER networks, it can be noticed
that full edge overlap is better for the level of cooperation displayed when b[2]/c[2]
is low (see the inset plot of Fig. 2 (a)), while no edge overlap promotes more
cooperation for higher values of the benefit to cost ratio in the second dimension.
Similarly, positive degree correlation in the BA networks leads to higher fraction
of strong agents for small benefit to cost ratios(inset plot of Fig. 2 (a)), while
negative degree correlation is better for supporting cooperation when b[2]/c[2] is
high.
We point out that due to the uniform probability of dimension update there
is a symmetric relationship between changes in the benefit to cost ratios in both
dimensions and the fraction of strong agents, i.e. a change in b[l]/c[l] in one
dimension has the same effect as a change in the other dimension. Any slight
adjustment in the probabilities only changes the symmetry towards one of the
dimensions, which means that the results should not be gradually altered. Hence,
we can use the properties derived in the previous section as a starting point for
the inspection of the results.
This reduces the analysis to studying the steady state distribution of the
index Z. We note that, according to our interaction model, higher values of the
index imply more frequent cooperation requests, and hence, lower incentives for
cooperation. For this purpose in panels (c)-(d) of Fig. 2 we plot the typical prob-
ability density function (PDF) for the Z index for the same random multiplex
networks where the dimension presence is given by a uniform probability by
averaging the index across 1000 network realizations. There, in black, we also
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Fig. 2: (a-b) Fraction of strong agents σ as a function of the benefit to cost ratio
in the second dimension, b[2]/c[2], for a sample of the random graphs that we
study, while b[1]/c[1] = 1.08. (a) ER multiplex networks with uniform update.
(b) BA multiplex networks with uniform update. (c-d) Probability density func-
tion for the steady state Z index for the same random graphs averaged across
1000 realizations and the corresponding one-dimensional graphs (in black). (c)
ER multiplex networks. (d) BA multiplex networks. (c-d) The black curve il-
lustrates the distribution of Z in the one-dimensional representation of the cor-
responding random graph. All networks have 100 agents and average degree 8.
depict the PDF of Z for the one dimensional ER and BA networks6. For the
ER graphs, it can be seen that the exclusion of overlapping edges effectively
increases the mode of the distribution. Since the average level of cooperation
at the point where cooperation begins to exist is determined by the left tail
of the distribution, the networks with lower modes, and thus larger left tails,
should be able to promote more cooperation. Contrastingly, the fatness of the
right tail leads to higher thresholds for displaying full network cooperation. In a
similar fashion, we notice that by decreasing the correlation between the degrees
6 Note that the full overlap multiplex ER graph coincides with the one-dimensional
representation.
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in the multiplex BA graph, the right tail of Z decreases, and therefore the lower
threshold for full cooperation.
Finally, in the inset plots of Fig. 2 (a)-(b) we observe that the inclusion of
a second dimension leads to significantly lower threshold for existence of coop-
eration in the system (which in the one dimensional case is b/c > 1 [48,46]).
This implies that the other dimension acts as a support for existence of coop-
eration even if the original dimension does not allow it. This is a result of the
fact that the negative payoffs from the original dimension are compensated with
positive payoffs from the supporting dimension. If at least one agent receives
higher steady state payoff from the supporting dimension than the loss in the
original, then cooperation will persist. This is an important implication to the
emergence of cooperation in systems where all dimensions of the network can
not be observed and the environment is not suited for cooperation, while the
phenomena is still detected.
4.3 The role of dynamics in the dimension update rule
Predetermined presence is a plausible assumption for systems where the flow
between dimensions is constrained and agents are not allowed to develop beliefs
about which dimensions generate higher payoffs to them. A more realistic case
would be to allow for dynamics in the probability that agent i is present in
dimension l in round t. While this can be modeled by introducing Markov tran-
sition rates for moving from one dimension to another, or even adding memory
rates to the movement based on the experience in the previous rounds, here we
consider a simpler update rooted in the same generalized reciprocity rule that
was used for the internal state update.
Concretely, we consider an update based on the accumulated payoff in the
dimension,
Y
[l]
i (t) = Y
[l]
i (t− 1) + y
[l]
i (t), (11)
with Y
[l]
i (0) being the initial condition and y
[l]
i (0) = 0. In our model the updated
probability of presence of agent i in dimension l is given by the softmax function
B
[l]
i (t+ 1) =
exp
(
Y
[l]
i (t)
)
∑
m exp
(
Y
[m]
i (t)
) . (12)
We remark that the described rule is similar in spirit to the famous Roth-Erev
reinforcement learning algorithm for strategies in extensive form games [41]. In
fact, based on (11) and (12), an analogy with more general multi-agent reinforce-
ment learning models can be established [12,21]. The connection is provided by
interpreting the act of presence of agent i in dimension l of the multiplex net-
work as a selection of a strategy Sl (from a set of L preselected strategies), where
the strategy selection is applied with probability B
[l]
i . In this context, the total
payoff Y
[l]
i in the network dimension l is analogous to the propensity to play
strategy Sl. We note that the here applied rule (12) is different from the one
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introduced in the original Roth-Erev learning model, according to which strat-
egy l is selected with probability B
[l]
i (t+ 1) =
Y
[l]
i
(t)
∑
m Y
[m]
i
(t)
. Specifically, it can be
considered as a special case of a more general reinforcement learning scheme in
which the probabilities for players to choose certain actions are taken from a
general Gibbs-Boltzmann distribution
B
[l]
i (t+ 1) =
exp
(
λ ·Y
[l]
i (t)
)
∑
m exp
(
λ · Y
[m]
i (t)
) . (13)
In (13) λ plays the role of ”inverse temperature” in statistical physics, and
captures the trade-off between exploitation (λ = ∞), i.e. greedy learning in
which only the action with the highest propensity is taken, and exploration
(λ = 0), meaning that all actions are equally probable. In many reinforcement
learning problems, the key is to find a value of λ that achieves a reasonable trade-
off between exploitation and exploration in the model of question. In our model,
the selection of this parameter would critically determine the behavior in the
system when, for example, some dimensions are erased. We expect that in that
case selecting the parameter λ towards the ”exploration mode” would provide
certain robustness to such events. The exact quantification of these effects under
this scenario, together with the role of the network topology, is out of the scope of
this manuscript. However, it represents an interesting direction for future work.
The advantage of the suggested update is that it can be very easily imple-
mented since the agent only needs to know the probability B
[l]
i (t) in the current
round for all dimensions and the received payoff y
[l]
i (t) from them.
We point out that the steady state solution of equation (12) is not defined
if more than one Y
[l]
i tends to infinity. This never happens as long as each
agent experiences different dynamics when the dimensions are considered as
separate networks. Another thing worth emphasizing is that the resulting system
has (L− 1)N degrees of freedom, and, hence, complex behavior is unavoidable.
Therefore, in the comparative statics as starting points for the probability that
an agent is present in a certain dimension we consider real numbers whose values
are comparable to the steady state of the preceding benefit to cost ratios. In the
beginning, at the lowest benefit to cost ratios, the starting point is set to be
equal among all agents and dimensions.
The results for the same networks as in the previous section are shown in
Fig. 3. Panels (a)-(b) depict the fraction of strong agents as a function of the
benefit to cost ratios. On the one hand, we observe that the global level of
cooperation displayed for low b[2]/c[2] ratios is increased by a large amount when
compared to the predetermined probability for dimension presence. On the other
hand, we notice that for larger benefit to cost ratios, the overall level of displayed
cooperation is not consistent in terms of performance. More precisely, there are
situations in which it is decreased (e.g. the no-overlap ER network), and there
are situations in which it is increased (e.g. the positive correlation BA network)
when compared to predetermined presence.
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Fig. 3: (a-b) Fraction of strong agents σ as a function of the benefit to cost ratio
in the second dimension, b[2]/c[2], for a sample of the random graphs that we
study, while b[1]/c[1] = 1.08. (a) ER multiplex network with generalized reci-
procity update. (b) BA multiplex network with generalized reciprocity update.
(c-d) For the same graphs, the fraction of individuals 〈B[l]∗〉 which in the steady
state are present in the first dimension.
This aggregate behavior can be explained by looking at (c)-(d) of Fig. 3,
where we display the fraction of individuals which in steady state are present
in the first dimension as a function of the same parameters. Obviously, the di-
mension in which the agents are always present in steady state is not always the
same, i.e. it is dispersed among the agents depending on the network topology
and parameters. This is a key feature of the model since it implies that the di-
mension update rule forces the agents to accommodate their presence towards
the dimension where they either carry the smallest burden to cooperate or where
most of their cooperative neighbors are present. As such, when coupled with the
generalized reciprocity state update rule (5), the dimension update rule facili-
tates the promotion of cooperation in the system (in the sense that it promotes
the existence of agents with p∗i > 0).
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It is worth mentioning that the fact that agents may accommodate their
presence to the dimension where most of their cooperative neighbors are present
indicates that full unconditional cooperation is not guaranteed to be achieved in
an easier fashion. In particular, the dimension update rule may force an agent
in steady state to be present in a dimension which is less suited for its personal
gain than some predetermined rule just because most of the other agents are
present in that dimension. Exactly this may be the cause for the lower level of
cooperation exhibited in the no-overlap ER network. Due to the manner in which
the edges are constructed in this graph, it may happen that some agents to have
high neighborhood importance index in the first dimension but low in the other.
For these agents, a uniform predetermined rule would imply that they would be
able to generate a higher payoff by interacting in the dimension where they are
less burdened. However, none of their neighbors with lower value of Z would be
better of if they are present in it due to lower benefit to cost ratio and, more
importantly, due to being less forced to answer to a cooperation request. As a
consequence, these group of agents accommodate their presence in the second
dimension, and the agents with high neighborhood importance index in it are
also forced to be present in it.
4.4 Real-world examples
As a means to provide an intuitive example for the experimental application of
the model we utilize social network data that describes relationships between
households in Indian Villages [5]. In this dataset there are a total of 75 villages
(networks) each represented through 12 separate dimensions. Since, there is a
significant overlap in the way the separate dimensions are constructed (see [5]
for a detailed description), here we consider only 4 dimensions that describe
essentially disparate types of social interactions. In the first dimension, the links
represent relationships between households who help each other with making
decision, the second and third, respectively, describe the borrowing interactions
of money and kerosene and rice. Finally, the fourth dimension are the medical
advice relations.
For estimation purposes, we exclude households that have no neighbors in at
least one of the studied dimensions. Thus we end up studying 75 different multi-
plex networks each consisting of 4 dimensions and on average 126.45 individuals
(with a standard deviation of 43.59). More detailed summary statistics are given
in Table 1.
For easier interpretation of the results, in the numerical estimations we set
homogeneous benefits and costs. In Fig. 4 panel (a) we plot the average fraction
of strong agents as a function of the benefit and cost ratio b/c across all multi-
plex networks with and without the dimension update rule. There, we also depict
the same variable when each dimension is considered as a separate network. In
general, we observe that the dynamics of the examples in which the dimension
update rule is at force supports most cooperation, followed by the uniform up-
date rule. In this particular example, the individual dimensions behave as worst
promoters of cooperation based on generalized reciprocity.
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Table 1: Villages networks summary statistics
Dimension Avg. degree Med. degree Avg. clustering Avg. shortest path
Help with Decision 3.21 (0.48) 2.70 (0.56) 0.16 (0.06) 4.35 (1.28)
Borrow money 3.76 (0.73) 3.35 (0.78) 0.21 (0.06) 4.14 (1.22)
Borrow rice and kerosene 4.26 (0.71) 3.69 (0.69) 0.19 (0.07) 3.76 (0.84)
Give medical advice 3.82 (0.68) 3.48 (0.72) 0.26 (0.05) 4.46 (1.32)
Note: Standard deviations in brackets.
Similar to the previous results, these are also best explained if we look at
the steady state distribution of the index Z (panel (b) of Fig. 4). In particular,
it can be seen that the average distribution for Z in the multiplex network
with dimension update rule has tails that are less fat than the other example
structures. Clearly, this is a result of the agents being able to accommodate
to the dimension where they receive highest payoff, differently from the other
structures that are compared. As evidenced in panel (c) of Fig. 4, where we show
the average steady state probability for dimension presence (averaged across
agents and estimations), in steady state the agent presence distribution for the
dimensions is well diversified. While most of the agents choose to be present
in the Medical advice dimension, there are some agents that favor the other
dimensions. Consequently, the mass of the distribution of Z is driven towards
one. In other words, Property 5. is easily satisfied for most agents solely by
assuming b/c > 1 and Property 6. is reached with lower b/c ratio. On the other
hand, all other distributions exhibit fatter tails, and hence require higher benefit
to cost ratio in order for full cooperation to appear. This is especially true for
the help with a decision dimension when it is considered as a separate network.
Evidently, in it there is a small group of agents that receive cooperation requests
way more often than they send. The fat tail of Z in the help with a decision
dimension can be a direct result of the fact that this dimension has on average
the lowest clustering coefficient. Concretely, many of the possible triads of edges
are not formed, which in turn leads to excessive burden to a particular group of
agents for which the edges in the possible triad exist.
5 Conclusions
The emergence of cooperation in complex networks precludes the existence of
a specific behavioral mechanism and a particular network interaction struc-
ture [30]. This interaction structure often exhibits multidimensional features
such as relationships of different types or temporal dynamics.
Against this background, we studied the cooperation dynamics under a be-
havioral mechanism based on generalized reciprocity, in a network consisting of
multiple dimensions, each modeled by a random graph. The model, which is a
generalization of the one introduced in [48], provides new insights on the role of
the network structure on the promotion of cooperation in complex multidimen-
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Fig. 4: (a) Average fraction of unconditional cooperators σ as a function of b/c for
the multiplex networks with dimension update rule (black), with uniform update
(red), and for the individual networks: help with a decision (blue), borrow money
(green), borrow rice and kerosene (magenta) and give medical advice (yellow).
The dashed vertical line indicates the threshold for full network cooperation in
the update rule case. (b) Average distribution of the index Z for the networks.
The illustrated distribution for the networks in which the dimension update
rule is at force is estimated with the steady state probabilities averaged across
estimations. (c) Average fraction of steady state presence 〈B∗〉i when there is a
generalized reciprocity update rule for it.
sional networks. In particular, we demonstrated that a multidimensional struc-
ture may support cooperation within the individual network dimensions, even
when the benefit-to-cost ratio in the considered dimensions is below the thresh-
old required for cooperation (when observed in isolation). This observation may
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explain the existence of cooperation in systems where the network parameters
itself would promote defection – a latent structure (i.e. other dimensions) may
exist that acts as a support to the observed dynamics.
We also discussed the connection between the studied behavioral mechanism
in the multidimensional network and reinforcement learning, by interpreting the
act of presence of agents in the dimensions of the multiplex network as a selection
of a strategy (from a predefined set of strategies), where the strategy selection
is applied in relation to agents’ internal state. In this context, we introduced a
simple and intuitive rule for modeling the agents’ interactions in the different
dimensions (i.e. their presence across dimensions). The experiments were per-
formed both on an multidimensional extension of the random graph models, and
on a real-life dataset. As a general observation, the cooperative contributions of
the individual agents concentrate in the dimension which is most favorable for
the existence of cooperation.
An interesting direction for future work is the study of more general behav-
ioral mechanisms in the spirit of the ”exploration vs. exploitation” discussion in
reinforcement learning. In this context, it will be valuable to study not only the
steady-state, but also the transient behavior in the network. As a final note, the
model can also be used as a starting point in the examination of network forma-
tion based on generalized reciprocity, where the neighborhood of each agent in
each dimension can be seen as the possible final outcome of a rewiring process
that is determined by the dimension update rule.
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